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Abstract— For future application of automated vehicles in
public traffic, ensuring functional safety is essential. In this
context, a hazard analysis and risk assessment is an important
input for designing functionally vehicle automation systems. In
this contribution, we present a detailed hazard analysis and risk
assessment (HARA) according to the ISO 26262 standard for
a specific Level 4 application, namely an unmanned protective
vehicle operated without human supervision for motorway hard
shoulder roadworks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The automation of the driving task is probably the most
challenging field of research in the automotive context.
Level 4 and Level 5 systems – according to the definition of
SAE [1] – combine the unlimited set of operational scenarios
encountered in public traffic with the absence of human
supervision. This implies highest demands regarding func-
tional safety throughout the development of these systems.
Thus, the applicability of the ISO 26262 standard [2] – the
most recent standard for designing safety-relevant electronic
systems in the automotive context – must be examined.
Following the ISO 26262 standard, a hazard analysis and
risk assessment (HARA) is required in order to determine
the criticality of the system under consideration. The results
of the HARA strongly influence the efforts to be undertaken
in the subsequent development steps for ensuring functional
safety. Normally, the results of HARAs are not published
and thus cannot be discussed in the scientific community
due to reasons of non-disclosure. This also applies to the
field of vehicle automation.
However, exceptionally high demands regarding system
implementation and its safety result from the missing human
supervision. Hence, in-depth discussions about functional
safety are crucial before deploying automated vehicles in
public traffic. In this contribution, we present the complete
results of a HARA conducted for a specific Level 4 appli-
cation. The paper structures as follows: We introduce the
project aFAS and the functionality to be implemented in
the project in Section II. In Section III, we define relevant
terms, describe the HARA approach, and highlight important
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Fig. 1. Dependence of AFA Logic and connected elements
results. Finally, Section IV contains the implications on
designing vehicle automation systems. Complete results of
the conducted HARA can be taken from the Appendix.
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including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & PROJECT CONTEXT
The project aFAS2 aims at developing an unmanned op-
eration of a protective vehicle (AFA3) on the hard shoulder
of highways in Germany, cf. [3]. The vehicle is operated
without supervision on hard shoulders only and with low
speed of up to 12 km/h. The automated operation consists
of three operating modes complemented by the Manual
Mode which comprises the normal operation of the AFA
with a human driver. Safe Halt serves as initial operating
mode as well as for switching between Follow Mode and
Coupled Mode. Furthermore, Safe Halt is activated if the
system leaves functional system boundaries. In Follow Mode,
the AFA follows the leading vehicle, which conducts the
actual work such as cleaning the hard shoulder, in a defined
distance of about 90 m. To follow the leading vehicle and
to stay on the hard shoulder, the AFA perceives the leading
vehicle as well as lane markings of the hard shoulder by
environment sensors. In Coupled Mode, the AFA follows the
leading vehicle in close distance of about 10 m in order to
pass acceleration and deceleration lanes. This is primarily
realized through motion data of the leading vehicle. For
transmitting system states and commands (e. g. changes of
operating modes), the vehicles communicate via radio.
For the HARA presented in the following (cf. Section III),
we concentrated on the parts that are specific for the au-
tomated operation in order to reduce the complexity that
arises when considering the entire vehicle. The considered
functionality is summarized in terms of the item4 called
AFA Logic. However, for unmanned operation additional
elements are required, namely drivetrain, brakes, steering
and environment perception. These elements are connected
with the AFA Logic as depicted in Fig. 1. Hence, safety
requirements can be inherited between connected elements.
2German abbreviation for “Automated Unmanned Protective Vehicle for
Highway Hard Shoulder Road Works”
3German abbreviation for “Automated Unmanned Protective Vehicle”
4Defined as “system or array of systems to implement a function at the
vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is applied” [2, 1.69]
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III. HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT
A. Terminology
A major contribution of the ISO 26262 standard is the
definition of more than 100 terms related to functional
safety of automotive electric/electronic systems. Yet, some
terms must be further clarified for automated driving. In the
context of the HARA, the terms hazard, hazardous event,
operational situation, and malfunctioning behavior are the
most common terms encountered. The term hazard [2, 1.57]
is defined as “potential source of harm”, which is consistent
to other definitions in safety engineering, e. g. [4], [5]. The
definition used in the ISO 26262 standard specifies that a
hazard is caused by malfunctioning behavior. Malfunctioning
behavior itself is either caused by failures or unintended
behavior of the system [2, 1.73]. Hence, the definitions
of hazard and malfunctioning behavior are applicable for
automated driving.
Furthermore, combining operational situation and hazard
yields a hazardous event [2, 1.59]. In contrast to hazard
and malfunctioning behavior, the ISO 26262 standard’s def-
initions of the terms operational situation and hazardous
event are vague with respect to automated driving. A similar
vagueness can be found in [4] and [5]. An operational
situation is defined as “scenario that can occur during a
vehicle’s life” [2, 1.83], equaling the terms situation and
scenario. However, both terms – together with the term
scene – are widely used in the context of automated driving
and must be distinguished from each other according to
Ulbrich et al. [6], who present a comprehensive literature
review regarding these terms. Ulbrich et al. define and
substantiate a scene as an all-encompassing snapshot of
an environment together with the self-representation of all
actors and observers contained (objective scene). In the real
world, a scene is always subjective for each observer. A
situation is derived from the subjective scene perceived by
a traffic participant. It contains all necessary premises to
derive suitable driving decisions. A scenario is the temporal
concatenation of related scenes. Hence, we utilize the term
operational scenario in preference to operational situation
in the following since an objective exterior view is what is
required for conducting a HARA.
The vagueness of the term hazardous event results from
the linguistic ambiguity of the term event. This ambiguity
is not resolved in the ISO 26262 standard. Event either
addresses a period of time or – in a physical/technical sense
– a point of time [7]. In engineering, one would consider the
latter as intended meaning, yet the temporal interpretation
is meant by the ISO 26262 standard in our understanding.
What is actually required for obtaining a classification of
safety criticality, is an operational scenario combined with
a hazard. Thus, we utilize the term hazardous scenario in
preference to hazardous event in the following.
B. Approach
For conducting a HARA, a linear reference process is
illustrated in the ISO 26262 standard [2, Part 3], which
rather addresses the interdependencies of single steps than
necessary iterations to reach completeness. Warg et al. [8]
describe an iterative process for developing HARAs in
the context of automated driving. The process we applied
in regard to the AFA Logic is similar to the approach
proposed by Warg et al. and is depicted in Fig. 2. Yet, our
approach differs from the approach of Warg et al. in certain
aspects and extends it as well: While Warg et al. take a
preliminary feature description as initial input resulting in
an item definition during the process, our process input is a
well advanced item definition.
Furthermore, we introduce two loops instead of one for
refining the work products. Effects of both loops on the AFA
Logic are described in the following subsection. The item
refinement – comparable to the function refinement of Warg
et al. [8] – describes extending or (in most cases) narrowing
the functional range of the item under consideration. By
this means, the merely functional consideration of the item
according to the ISO 26262 standard is supplemented by
considering technical feasibility, e. g. due to limited project
resources or not yet available technology. In contrast, the
safety refinement does not affect the functional range. Rather,
it aims at refining the determined hazardous scenarios in
order to enable technically realizable safety concepts through
reaching more precise and definite safety goals. The safety
refinement is comparable to the procedure to reach complete-
ness of HARAs of Johansson [9].
Apart from refinement, each iteration loop consists of six
steps. In the first step, functionalities are extracted from
the item definition. Subsequently, potential malfunctioning
behavior and related hazards are derived in the second and
third step, respectively. The combination of hazards and
operational scenarios derived from the item definition then
yields the hazardous scenarios in the fourth step. Determin-
ing Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) and safety
goals are the fifth and the sixth step in Fig. 2, which are
strongly linked.
C. Results
We developed the HARA together with experts from the
industrial members of the aFAS consortium1, in iterative
group meetings. As mentioned, the complete results can
be found in the Appendix. In the following, we highlight
selected results that affect functional range, environment
perception, human machine interface (HMI), and user inter-
action, as well as central control logic. Table I presents the
identified safety goals. Its order – as the HARA’s numbering
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Fig. 2. Process of HARA generation and refinement
TABLE I
PROTECTIVE VEHICLE’S SAFETY GOALS FOR UNMANNED OPERATION
ID Safety Goal
All operating modes
SG01 Unintended and not permitted operating mode change mustbe prevented.
SG02 Intended and permitted operating mode change must beensured.
SG07 Display of actual operating mode in HMI must be ensured.
Manual Mode
SG04 Unintended anti-lock brake actuation must be prevented.
SG05 Unintended acceleration must be prevented.
SG16 Anti-lock functionality must be ensured.
SG17 Unintended steering actuation must be prevented
Follow Mode, Coupled Mode, Safe Halt
SG03 Steering actuation beyond specification must be prevented.
SG06 Detection of driver intervention must be ensured.
SG08 Unintended slow acceleration must be prevented.
SG09 Deceleration to standstill must be ensured.
SG10 Leaving tolerance ranges must trigger operating mode changeto Safe Halt.
SG11 Maximum velocity must not be exceeded.
SG12 Overrunning hard shoulder markings must be prevented.
SG13 Detection of and reaction to (deceleration to standstill)relevant obstacles (humans, vehicles, etc.) must be ensured.
SG14 Identification of leading vehicle must be ensured.
SG15 Detection of missing leading vehicle and operating modechange to safe halt must be ensured.
in the Appendix – illustrates the several iterations necessary
to obtain a result commonly accepted among the contributors.
For instance, safety goal SG16 was added in a later iteration,
although strongly connected to safety goal SG04.
Initially, the functional range was supposed to include
automated unmanned operation on the motorway’s right lane
as well, in order to be capable of driving around obstacles on
the hard shoulder. During item refinement, however, the func-
tional range was reduced, as this feature was technically too
challenging due to limited project resources. Accordingly, the
unmanned operation was restricted to hard shoulders as well
as acceleration and deceleration lanes, both with a limited
velocity of 10 km/h (plus 2 km/h tolerance).
An example for the above mentioned safety refinement
loop are safety goals SG03 and SG12. Safety goal SG12
was established in one of the first iterations effecting high
ASIL ratings on all involved components, namely environ-
ment perception, AFA Logic, and actuators. In subsequent
iterations, we differentiated between unintended steering
actuation beyond the specification of the item definition (up
to full steering actuation) and unintended steering actuation
within the specification. This results in different hazardous
scenarios which were rated separately. Consequently, safety
goal SG03 was introduced, which targets at limiting the
maximum steering angle and thereby reduces the effects
of malfunctioning behavior of other system elements. Due
to the limited steering angle, the AFA will intrude the
right lane of the motorway with less lateral velocity. Thus,
the controllability rating can be reduced as other traffic
participants can react more appropriately. By this means, the
limitation of the steering angle in automated operation gains
the former high ASIL rating (ASIL D) of safety goal SG12
while the rating of safety goal SG12 is reduced (ASIL B).
The previous reduction of the ASIL rating of safety
goal SG12 also affects the functional block of the AFA
Logic, which must be implemented with ASIL B as well. In
discussions prior to the project start, a group of experts from
the consortium underestimated the efforts to be undertaken
for implementing the AFA Logic as well as of the human
machine interaction. If the operating mode is wrongly dis-
played, the AFA could intrude the right lane of the motorway
and cause severe accidents, cf. HARA IDs 37 and 37a in
the Appendix. Consequently, the correct display of the actual
operating mode must be ensured (safety goal SG07, ASIL A).
Both aspects illustrate the high demands on all system parts
which originate from the missing human supervision.
The HARA’s results concerning the environment percep-
tion are of particular interest, since automated vehicles are
operated in an open environment where they encounter an in-
finite set of operational scenarios. For the AFA, safety goals
SG12 and SG13 address environment perception. While
safety goal SG12 obtained an ASIL B rating, the detection
and reaction to obstacles on the path are rated with QM since
persons involved in the scenarios can generally control the
scenarios due to the low velocity of the AFA.
As already depicted in Fig. 1, the AFA Logic is connected
to further items. Although a HARA is a top-down procedure,
at some points technical aspects must be considered. In the
planned system implementation of the unmanned operation,
the AFA Logic has access to steering and brakes. In par-
ticular, the technical implementation of the brake system
creates potential for malfunctioning behavior. Therefore, the
manual operation must be considered in the HARA as well.
As the malfunctioning behavior can create critical outcome
in several scenarios, the related safety goals obtain highest
ASIL ratings. This means that elements connected to the
AFA Logic inherit according safety requirements.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Although the functional range considered in the aFAS
project is small compared to functional ranges of future
automated vehicles, several implications can be derived from
our experiences made. The presented HARA is primarily
based on the experience and knowledge of the involved
contributors from industry and academia with a range of
experience from one to more than ten years. Despite the
small functional range, the contributors agree on that it was
challenging to take all relevant aspects into account in order
to reach consistency between item definition and HARA.
This reflects in the several iterations necessary to reach a
common result. Using only expert knowledge might lead
to missed scenarios and thus to building unsafe systems.
Consequently, we expect that HARAs for systems featuring
more comprehensive functional ranges must be supported
by methods and tools. The approach for refining item and
safety aspects described in subsection III-B appears suitable
in general. However, more distinguished methods must be
developed for single steps in order to gain appropriate results.
As input to the HARA process, the AFA Logic’s item
definition is written in natural language, supported by some
tables and figures. All functionalities considered in the
HARA were extracted manually. This was a process taking
several iterations since functionalities had not been consid-
ered or had initially been defined contradictory. For items
with a wider functional range, item definitions with a more
extensive utilization of semi-formal or even formal notations
are necessary for ensuring proper identification of all relevant
functions and related malfunctioning behavior. Moreover,
this eases traceability between item definition and HARA.
For targeting completeness of hazardous scenarios, dif-
ferent approaches for identifying hazards and operational
scenarios can be found in literature. Comparable to the
approach in the aFAS project, Johansson [9] suggests experts
to challenge each single hazardous scenario. If they do not
find additional scenarios that lead to new safety goals, the list
is likely to be complete states Johansson. However, correct
ASIL ratings are required besides completeness of safety
goals. Thus, the aFAS consortium also considered ASIL rat-
ings of hazardous scenarios with the same safety goals. Warg
et al. [8] propose an identification of both hazards as well
as operational scenarios based on tree structures. Out of the
aFAS consortium, Bagschik et al. [10] propose an approach
for deriving all relevant hazardous scenarios systematically
by combining operating modes, functions (derived by skill
graphs), malfunctions (derived by a HAZOP analysis), and
scene discretization. However, suitability of these approaches
still needs to be proven for systems of future automated
vehicles in terms of considering all relevant scenarios. The
first two approaches need to prove their suitability for auto-
mated vehicles with a wider functional range. In contrast,
the approach of Bagschik et al. creates automatically an
extensive list of scenarios. However, each scenario must be
assessed manually regarding safety criticality.
Once hazardous scenarios are identified, the next challenge
is determining the ASIL classification. As already mentioned,
the classification for the unmanned operation of the AFA is
based on expert knowledge. A few aspects of the exposure
– such as the rate of emergency stopping vehicles – are
justified by investigations of the aFAS consortium. Severity
and controllability are purely based on experts’ contribution.
Furthermore, standards such as the SAE J2980 standard [11]
are of limited contribution for the project aFAS since they
do not consider operations on the hard shoulder and focus on
vehicle motion control systems. In general, controllability of
hazardous scenarios is very low for Level 4 or Level 5 ap-
plications with passengers. The controllability of hazardous
scenarios without passengers – as in the project aFAS –
is determined by surrounding traffic participants. For future
application of automated vehicles, methods for objectifica-
tion of the parameters must be discussed. At least, evolving
standards such as the SAE J2980 standard [11] towards
automated driving can support a common understanding.
So far, we conclude that methods for a systematic consid-
eration of each HARA step can be found in literature. Con-
sequently, one can argue that a holistic systematic HARA
process is beneficial, as i. a. presented by Kemmann and
Trapp [12] as well as by Beckers et al. [13]. Kemmann
and Trapp [12] introduce A Structured Approach for Hazard
Analysis and Risk Assessments (SAHARA), which systemat-
ically considers each HARA step. The authors consequently
use model based approaches for item definition, hazard
identification, as well as for classification of controllability,
severity, and exposure. Beckers et al. [13] emphasize utiliza-
tion of UML based notation. This ensures the traceability
throughout the HARA process and enables potential for
formal verification. Still, single HARA steps in the approach
of Becker et al. strongly depend on expert knowledge. For
both approaches, proof of applicability to automated vehicles
must be furnished.
V. CONCLUSION
The example of the unmanned protective vehicle reveals
challenges during a HARA for automated vehicles oper-
ated without human supervision. It was demonstrated that
conventional HARA approaches are of limited suitability,
especially for future applications with a wider functional
range. Consequently, already existing systematic approaches
must be evolved towards automated driving functionalities
without human supervision. For this, an in-depth considera-
tion of each single HARA step is required. Furthermore, for
merging the two worlds of automated driving and functional
safety, clarification of used terminology is crucial to reach a
common understanding.
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APPENDIX
Table II displays the HARA developed in the project aFAS. Omitted and alphanumeric IDs reflect the iterative process of HARA development during item and
safety refinement, cf. subsection III-B. Several IDs were discarded while the ID numbering was not adjusted, in order to preserve traceability between different HARA
versions.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE AUTOMATED OPERATION OF THE UNMANNED PROTECTIVE VEHICLE
ID OperatingMode Function Malfunction Hazardous Scenario and Consequence S Rationale E Rationale C Rationale A SG
1 ManualMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
other operating mode
Drive on road in convoy (up to 90 km/h, depending on speed limiter).
Operating mode change to Safe Halt leads to unpredictable
deceleration (4 m/s2 in Safe Halt according to Item Definition) to
standstill. The same applies when changing to Coupled Mode or
Follow Mode, as these operating modes then will be operated beyond
accepted parameters which causes an operating mode change to Safe
Halt. Deceleration leads to rear-end collision of succeeding vehicle.
S2
Assuming succeeding traffic
participants use seat belts and
brakes intuitively, the collision
will happen with medium velocity
which leads to severe injuries.
E4
Drive to and from location of road
works via roads and motorways
occurs for each road work.
C2
Traffic participants not complying with traffic
rules is commonly observable on German
motorways (exceeded velocities, tailgating, etc.).
Reaction time 1.5 s, distance 35 m, deceleration
−6 m/s2.
B SG01
2 ManualMode Steer Unintended steering
Drive on road or motorway. Unpredictable swerving from lane leads to
collision with other traffic participants. S3
Road: Head-on collision with
oncoming traffic, tree etc.
motorway: Collision with moving
traffic. Both scenarios can lead to
severe or fatal injuries.
E4
Drive to and from location of road
works via roads and motorways
occurs for each road work.
C3 Experience of Bosch Automotive Steering: Fullsteering angle due to failures is not controllable. D SG17
3 ManualMode Brake
Unintended braking
with anti-lock
functionality
Drive on road in convoy. Unpredictable maximum deceleration with
anti-lock functionality leads to rear-end collision of succeeding vehicle.
Malfunction possible due to the planned technical implementation.
S2
Assuming succeeding traffic
participants use seat belts and
brakes intuitively, the collision
will happen with medium velocity
which leads to severe injuries.
E4
Drive to and from location of road
works via roads and motorways
occurs for each road work.
C3
Traffic participants not complying with traffic
rules is commonly observable on German
motorways (exceeded velocities, tailgating, etc.).
Reaction time 1.5 s, distance 35 m, deceleration
−6 m/s2
C SG04
4 ManualMode Brake
Unintended braking
without anti-lock
functionality
Drive on road or motorway. Unpredictable maximum deceleration
without anti-lock functionality leads to locking tires. Lateral guidance
is not possible, the AFA becomes uncontrollable. The AFA leaves its
lane and collides with stationary objects or other vehicles. Malfunction
possible due to the planned technical implementation.
S3
Collision with uncontrollable
vehicle at high velocities leads to
severe or fatal injuries.
E4
Drive to and from location of road
works via roads and motorways
occurs for each road work.
C3
According to ISO26262-3, Table B4: Failure of
brakes→ brakes unintendedly stopping the
vehicle
D SG16
5 ManualMode Drive Unintended acceleration
Drive on road in convoy. Unintended acceleration leads to rear-end
collision with preceding vehicle. S3
Traffic participant skids, resulting
crash leads to severe and
life-threatening injuries.
E4
Drive to and from location of road
works via roads and motorways
occurs for each road work.
C0
Controllable in general. Due to inertia enough
time for driver of AFA to react, driver brakes
intuitively.
QM SG05
7 ManualMode HMI
HMI displays wrong
operating mode
No Hazard: Only road workers with special training are deployed on
AFA. In Manual Mode, the AFA is driven as usual. A wrong display of
operating modes leads to no more than short confusion.
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
8 Safe Halt
Detection of
driver
intervention
Driver intervention is
not detected Test operation on hard shoulder, driver intervention is not detected. S0
Driver intervention not detected in
Safe Halt does not lead to a
hazardous event.
E0
Driver intervention not detected in
Safe Halt does not lead to a
hazardous event.
C0 Driver intervention not detected in Safe Haltdoes not lead to a hazardous event. QM SG06
9 Safe Halt HMI HMI displays wrongoperating mode
No Hazard: AFA and leading vehicle in standstill. Operating mode
change can only be triggered by operator in leading vehicle.
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
10 Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Manual Mode
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA on hard shoulder starts to roll (slope,
automatic gearbox). This leads to unpredictable behavior including
intrusion into right lane. Truck avoids AFA, following truck touches
AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Scenario (sloped road, traffic on
right lane) usually met at each
deployment.
C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG01
10a Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Manual Mode
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA on hard shoulder starts to roll
(slope, automatic gearbox). This leads to unpredictable behavior
including intrusion into right lane. Car on right lane collides with
visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Scenario (sloped road, traffic on
right lane) usually met at each
deployment.
C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG01
11 Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Coupled Mode
No Hazard: Supervision works as defined in Coupled Mode. Immediate
operating mode change to Safe Halt since conditions for Coupled
Mode are not met (distance to leading vehicle, transmission of
odometry data of leading vehicle etc.)
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
12 Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Follow Mode
No Hazard: Due to necessary boundary conditions, Follow Mode
cannot be retained. Operating mode changes back to Safe Halt. S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
13 Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Manual
Mode is not executed
No Hazard: AFA still in standstill. S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
14 Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Coupled
Mode is not executed
No Hazard: AFA still in standstill. S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
15 Safe Halt
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Follow
Mode is not executed
No Hazard: AFA still in standstill. S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
16 Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance
Unintended (slow)
acceleration
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA on hard shoulder starts to roll (slope,
automatic gearbox). This leads to unpredictable behavior including
intrusion into right lane. Truck avoids AFA, following truck touches
AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Scenario usually met at each
deployment. C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG08
16a Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance
Unintended (slow)
acceleration
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA on hard shoulder starts to roll
(slope, automatic gearbox). This leads to unpredictable behavior
including intrusion into right lane. Car on right lane collides with
visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Scenario usually met at each
deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG08
Continued on next page ID: Identifier for hazardous scenario as in original document, S: Severity* (S0–S3), E: Exposure* (E0–E4), C: Controllability* (C0–C3), A: ASIL Rating (QM, ASIL A–D), SG: ID of Safety Goal (cf. Table I); *For reference cf. [2, Part 3] and [11]
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17 Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance
Unintended maximum
deceleration
No Hazard: Maximum deceleration unproblematic, as AFA decelerates
from very low velocity. Moreover, transition from Manual Mode to
Safe Halt only possible in standstill.
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
18 Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance No stop
Truck convoy on right lane. As there is no environment perception
active in Safe Halt, intrusion into right lane is possible. Truck avoids
AFA, following truck touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first
truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Safe Halt active at each
deployment. C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG09
18a Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance No stop
Moving car traffic on right lane. As there is no environment perception
active in Safe Halt, intrusion into right lane is possible. Car on right
lane collides with visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Safe Halt active at each
deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG09
19 Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance No stop
Obstacle, e. g. an emergency stopping vehicle, on hard shoulder. A
person stands between vehicle and AFA. AFA collides with vehicle. S2
Very low velocity of AFA. Person
between AFA and vehicle. This is
expected to lead to severe yet not
fatal injuries
E2
Obstacles on hard shoulder occur
approximately once per week. A
vehicle stopping between AFA
and leading vehicle is even more
unlikely.
C1
People between AFA and obstacle can easily
react to a non-stopping AFA by stepping aside
due to its low velocity.
QM SG09
19a Safe Halt Longitudinalguidance No stop
Obstacle, e. g. an emergency stopping vehicle, on hard shoulder,
passengers in vehicle. AFA collides with vehicle. S0
Very low velocity of AFA. No
injuries expected as people in
vehicle are protected by passenger
cabin.
E2
Obstacles on hard shoulder occur
approximately once per week. A
vehicle stopping between AFA
and leading vehicle is even more
unlikely.
C3
People in a stopping vehicle only have a very
small chance to react to the AFA colliding
unexpectedly. Driver might press the brake
pedal intuitively.
QM SG09
24 CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Manual Mode
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA on acceleration or deceleration lane.
Manual Mode without human driver. This leads to unpredictable
behavior including intrusion into right lane. Truck avoids AFA,
following truck touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG01
24a CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Manual Mode
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA on acceleration or deceleration
lane. Manual Mode without human driver. This leads to unpredictable
behavior including intrusion into right lane. Car on right lane collides
with visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG01
25 CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Safe Halt
Moving traffic on right lane. AFA stops on acceleration or deceleration
lane. Vehicles entering or leaving the motorway collide with AFA. S2
Rear-end collision with reduced
velocity E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C0
Driver of vehicle changing to deceleration lane
is already braking or ready for braking. Vehicle
on acceleration lane in general has moderate
velocity.
QM SG01
26 CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Follow Mode
Moving traffic on right lane. AFA stops on acceleration or deceleration
lane in order to build up required distance for Follow Mode. Vehicles
entering or leaving the motorway collide with AFA.
S2 Rear-end collision with reducedvelocity E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C0
Driver of vehicle changing to deceleration lane
is already braking or ready for braking. Vehicle
on acceleration lane in general has moderate
velocity.
QM SG01
27 CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Manual
Mode is not executed
No Hazard: Only for testing purposes. Driver can stop AFA
pneumatically by foot brake.
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
28 CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Safe Halt
is not executed
Truck convoy on right lane. Operating mode change to Safe Halt when
exceeding functional system boundaries is not executed. This leads to
unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane. Truck avoids
AFA, following truck touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first
truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG02
28a CoupledMode
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Safe Halt
is not executed
Moving car traffic on right lane. Operating mode change to Safe Halt
when exceeding functional system boundaries is not executed. This
leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane. Car
on right lane collides with visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG02
30 CoupledMode
Longitudinal
and lateral
guidance
Vehicle does not follow
in defined distance
(tolerance range lateral
or longitudinal)
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA follows leading vehicle with lateral
and longitudinal offsets which exceed the tolerance ranges. AFA is
partially driving on right lane. Truck avoids AFA, following truck
touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C0
Traffic participants can control the AFA
protruding into the right lane as the warning
device is active as well as lateral and
Longitudinal guidance function as intended
apart from the lateral offset.
QM SG10
30a CoupledMode
Longitudinal
and lateral
guidance
Vehicle does not follow
in defined distance
(tolerance range lateral
or longitudinal)
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA follows leading vehicle with
lateral and longitudinal offsets which exceed the tolerance ranges. AFA
is partially driving on right lane. Car on right lane collides with visible
AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C0
Traffic participants can control the AFA
protruding into the right lane as the warning
device is active as well as lateral and
Longitudinal guidance function as intended
apart from the lateral offset.
QM SG10
31 CoupledMode
Longitudinal
guidance
Vehicle exceeds
maximum speed of
12 km/h
Truck convoy on right lane. The functional components are designed
for velocities up to 12 km/h. AFA drives at not excessively higher
velocity. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads to
unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane (e. g.
oscillating steering angle control). Truck avoids AFA, following truck
touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG11
31a CoupledMode
Longitudinal
guidance
Vehicle exceeds
maximum speed of
12 km/h
Moving car traffic on right lane. The functional components are
designed for velocities up to 12 km/h. AFA drives at not excessively
higher velocity. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads
to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane (e. g.
oscillating steering angle control). Car on right lane collides with
visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG11
33 CoupledMode
Longitudinal
guidance Unintended deceleration
Moving traffic on right lane. AFA stops on acceleration or deceleration
lane. Vehicles entering or leaving the motorway collide with AFA. S2
Rear-end collision with reduced
velocity E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C0
Driver of vehicle changing to deceleration lane
is already braking or ready for braking. Vehicle
on acceleration lane in general has moderate
velocity.
QM SG04
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34 CoupledMode
Radio com-
munication
Vehicle drives without
radio communication
AFA stops due to inconsistent data of radio communication and
environment perception on acceleration or deceleration lane. Vehicles
entering or leaving the motorway collide with AFA.
S2 Rear-end collision with reducedvelocity E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C0
Driver of vehicle changing to deceleration lane
is already braking or ready for braking. Vehicle
on acceleration lane in general has moderate
velocity.
QM SG10
35 CoupledMode
Lateral
guidance
Steering angle change
beyond maximum
specification (angle &
change rate)
AFA drifts with up to maximum possible yaw rate into right lane. S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Passing acceleration and
deceleration lanes occurs on each
deployment.
C3
AFA drifts quickly (e. g.0.4 m/s lateral) into
the right lane. It follows a circular arc to the
guardrail on the left of the left lane. This is
difficult to control by traffic participants.
D SG03
36 FollowMode
Detection of
driver
intervention
Driver intervention is
not detected Test operation on hard shoulder, driver intervention is not detected. S0
Only for testing purposes. Driver
can stop AFA pneumatically by
foot brake.
E0
Only for testing purposes. Driver
can stop AFA pneumatically by
foot brake.
C0 Only for testing purposes. Driver can stop AFApneumatically by foot brake. QM SG06
37 FollowMode HMI
HMI displays wrong
operating mode
Truck convoy on right lane. Leading vehicle in standstill, AFA in
Follow Mode. HMI displays Safe Halt or Coupled Mode. AFA starts
delayed to follow leading vehicle and enters acceleration or
deceleration lane. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This
leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane.
Truck avoids AFA, following truck touches AFA as the AFA is
masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
A SG07
37a FollowMode HMI
HMI displays wrong
operating mode
Moving car traffic on right lane. Leading vehicle in standstill, AFA in
Follow Mode. HMI displays Safe Halt or Coupled Mode. AFA starts
delayed to follow leading vehicle and enters acceleration or
deceleration lane. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This
leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane. Car
on right lane collides with visible AFA.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
A SG07
38 FollowMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Manual Mode
Truck convoy on right lane. Manual Mode without driver. This leads to
unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane. Truck avoids
AFA, following truck touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first
truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG01
38a FollowMode
Operating
mode
change
Unintended or not
permitted transition to
Manual Mode
Moving car traffic on right lane. Manual Mode without driver. This
leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane. Car
on right lane collides with visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG01
41 FollowMode
Follow hard
shoulder
Vehicle does not follow
hard shoulder
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA intrudes right lane. Truck avoids
AFA, following truck touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first
truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG12
41a FollowMode
Follow hard
shoulder
Vehicle does not follow
hard shoulder
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA intrudes right lane. Car on right
lane collides with visible AFA. S3
Collision with high differential
velocity. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG12
42 FollowMode
Keep
defined
distance
Vehicle does not follow
in defined tolerance
range
No Hazard: AFA continues following hard shoulder based on lane
marking. Obstacle detection functions. AFA stops if distance to leading
vehicle is too large (leading vehicle out of sight, interruption of radio
communication).
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
43 FollowMode
Obstacle
detection
Vehicle does not react
to obstacle
Obstacle, e. g. an emergency stopping vehicle, on hard shoulder. A
person stands between vehicle and AFA. AFA collides with vehicle. S2
Very low velocity of AFA. Person
between AFA and vehicle. This is
expected to lead to severe yet not
fatal injuries
E2
Obstacles on hard shoulder occur
approximately once per week. A
vehicle stopping between AFA
and leading vehicle is even more
unlikely.
C1
People between AFA and obstacle can easily
react to a non-stopping AFA by stepping aside
due to its low velocity.
QM SG13
43a FollowMode
Obstacle
detection
Vehicle does not react
to obstacle
Obstacle, e. g. an emergency stopping vehicle, on hard shoulder,
passengers in vehicle. AFA collides with vehicle. S0
Very low velocity of AFA. No
injuries expected as people in
vehicle are protected by passenger
cabin.
E2
Obstacles on hard shoulder occur
approximately once per week. A
vehicle stopping between AFA
and leading vehicle is even more
unlikely.
C3
People in a stopping vehicle only have a very
small chance to react to the AFA colliding
unexpectedly. Driver might press the brake
pedal intuitively.
QM SG13
44 FollowMode
Longitudinal
guidance Unintended deceleration
No Hazard: AFA stops on hard shoulder with active warning device
and transitions to Safe Halt. S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
45 FollowMode
Perceive
leading
vehicle
Vehicle keeps distance
to wrong object
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA follows wrong leading vehicle which
does not stop in front of acceleration or deceleration lanes. AFA
exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads to unpredictable
behavior including intrusion into right lane. Truck avoids AFA,
following truck touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E1
Vehicle driving on hard shoulder
for a longer period of time and
with velocity ≤ 10 km/h occurs
very rarely.
C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
QM SG14
45a FollowMode
Perceive
leading
vehicle
Vehicle keeps distance
to wrong object
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA follows wrong leading vehicle
which does not stop in front of acceleration or deceleration lanes. AFA
exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads to unpredictable
behavior including intrusion into right lane. Car on right lane collides
with visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E1
Vehicle driving on hard shoulder
for a longer period of time and
with velocity ≤ 10 km/h occurs
very rarely.
C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
QM SG14
46 FollowMode
Perceive
leading
vehicle
Vehicle follows hard
shoulder without
leading vehicle
Truck convoy on right lane as well as vehicles driving on acceleration
and deceleration lane. AFA does not detect begin of acceleration or
deceleration lane. Thus, it exceeds its functional system boundaries.
This leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E0
Operating instructions prohibit
activation of automated operation
without leading vehicle.
C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
QM SG15
46a FollowMode
Perceive
leading
vehicle
Vehicle follows hard
shoulder without
leading vehicle
Moving car traffic on right lane as well as vehicles driving on
acceleration and deceleration lane. AFA does not detect begin of
acceleration or deceleration lane. Thus, it exceeds its functional system
boundaries. This leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion
into right lane.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E0
Operating instructions prohibit
activation of automated operation
without leading vehicle.
C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
QM SG15
47 FollowMode
Radio com-
munication
Vehicle leaves range of
radio communication
No Hazard: Interruption of radio communication causes transition to
Safe Halt. AFA stops on hard shoulder with active warning device. S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
Continued on next page ID: Identifier for hazardous scenario as in original document, S: Severity* (S0–S3), E: Exposure* (E0–E4), C: Controllability* (C0–C3), A: ASIL Rating (QM, ASIL A–D), SG: ID of Safety Goal (cf. Table I); *For reference cf. [2, Part 3] and [11]
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48 FollowMode
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Safe Halt
is not executed
Truck convoy on right lane. AFA must transit to Safe Halt, e. g. due to
exceeding a functional system boundary. transition to Safe Halt does
not function. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads to
unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane (e. g.
oscillating steering angle control). Truck avoids AFA, following truck
touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG02
48a FollowMode
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Safe Halt
is not executed
Moving car traffic on right lane. AFA must transit to Safe Halt, e. g.
due to exceeding a functional system boundary. transition to Safe Halt
does not function. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This
leads to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane (e. g.
oscillating steering angle control). Car on right lane collides with
visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG02
49 FollowMode
Operating
mode
change
Intended and permitted
transition to Manual
Mode is not executed
No Hazard: Only for testing purposes. Driver can stop AFA
pneumatically by foot brake.
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
50 FollowMode
Radio com-
munication
Vehicle drives without
radio communication
No Hazard: Detection of lane markings and obstacles as well as HMI
function as intended. AFA stops when leading vehicle stops according
work instructions before passing acceleration or deceleration lanes.
Then, malfunction becomes obvious by missing transition to Coupled
Mode.
S0 — E0 — C0 — QM —
51 FollowMode
Longitudinal
guidance
Vehicle exceeds
maximum speed of
12 km/h
Truck convoy on right lane. The functional components are designed
for velocities up to 12 km/h. AFA drives at not excessively higher
velocity. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads to
unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane (e. g.
oscillating steering angle control). Truck avoids AFA, following truck
touches AFA as the AFA is masked by first truck.
S2 Collision with high differentialvelocity, vehicles slightly touch. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C2
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Despite of masking by truck
in front, following traffic is normally able to
recognize this and react appropriately (braking,
avoiding).
B SG11
51a FollowMode
Longitudinal
guidance
Vehicle exceeds
maximum speed of
12 km/h
Moving car traffic on right lane. The functional components are
designed for velocities up to 12 km/h. AFA drives at not excessively
higher velocity. AFA exceeds functional system boundaries. This leads
to unpredictable behavior including intrusion into right lane (e. g.
oscillating steering angle control). Car on right lane collides with
visible AFA.
S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C1
AFA drifts slowly (e. g. 0.4 m/s lateral) into
right driving lane. Following traffic is easily
able to recognize this and react appropriately
(braking, avoiding).
B SG11
52 FollowMode
Lateral
guidance
Steering angle change
beyond maximum
specification (angle &
change rate)
AFA drifts with up to maximum possible yaw rate into right lane. S3 Collision with high differentialvelocity. E4
Operation on hard shoulder occurs
on each deployment. C3
AFA drifts quickly (e. g.0.4 m/s lateral) into
the right lane. It follows a circular arc to the
guardrail on the left of the left lane. This is
difficult to control by traffic participants.
D SG03
Table concluded ID: Identifier for hazardous scenario as in original document, S: Severity* (S0–S3), E: Exposure* (E0–E4), C: Controllability* (C0–C3), A: ASIL Rating (QM, ASIL A–D), SG: ID of Safety Goal (cf. Table I); *For reference cf. [2, Part 3] and [11]
